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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Redman Warehousing Corporation
against the several defendants seeking reimbursement for expenses
Redman incurred in preserving and protecting property stored in
Redman's warehouse which property was damaged in floods at the
Freeport Center on the 13th and 19th of July, 1973.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Surranary Judgment has been granted against plaintiffappellan t and in favor of defendant Clearfield City Corporation
(hereinafter Clearfield) which decision is not appealed.

Summary

Judgment was later granted to defendant-respondent Freeport
Center (hereinafter Freeport Center) which is the subject of
this appeal.

The case still pends in the lower court against

defendant
Corporation.
ponsored
by the S.J. Whirlpool
Quinney Law Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order Granting Sum.
mary Judgment in favor of Freeport Center.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant is a Texaa corporation engaged ir
the warehousing business in the State of Utah.

(R - 1)

I

i

I t ston: I

substantial amounts of property for defendant Whirlpool Corpor;.(
tion (R. 4, 20) which sustained water damage in two separate
floods on July 13 and 19, 1973.

:

Plaintiff incurred $33 ,480.57

in expenses in preserving, protecting and res taring the water· 1:
damaged property (R. 3, 29).

On December 6, 1973, plaintiff

filed its Complaint (R. 18, reverse side) seeking

:

reimbursemen~

I'

from Whirlpool Corporation, Clearfield and/or Freeport Center I
in the sum of $28,480.57, or $33,480.57.

(R. 5)

Summons were 1

I

prepared and mailed to the Davis County Sheriff's Office on

December 16, 1974 (R. 323), and defendant Clearfield was sernc:
on December 23, 1974 (R. 324).

I

The Record does not indicate

when defendant Whirlpool was served, but the fact that Whirlpoc:I,
was served is shown by Whirlpool's Answer filed January 6, 19;:
(R. 20, reverse side)

I
I

The litigation thereafter actively pro· I

ceeded between appellant, Whirlpool and Clearfield.

On

s t .1.I
ep

e-'i

27, 1976, a Summons was issued (R. 204) and the Surmnons and
Septet· I
Complaint were served upon defendant Freeport Center on
I
ber 29, 1976.

(R. 205)

Freeport Center filed its Answer and

Cross-Claim on October 26, 1976

(R. 206)

The Answer did not

I

I
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_J

raise the defense of insufficiency of process (R. 206-210), nor
did any motion pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The Answer did, however, raise the affirma-

tive defense of Statute of Limitations (R. 206)

On February 4,

1977, defendant Freeport Center filed a Motion to Amend its
Answer so as to raise the defense of insufficiency of process.
(R.

297, 298)

Court.

That Motion has never been granted by the lower

Defendant Freeport Center filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment and supporting Memorandum on the same date.

(R. 303-308)

Appellant submitted its Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's
motion on March 18, 1977.

(R. 319-325)

The 'motion was argued

and granted on March 22, 1977, Judge Wahlquist presiding.

(R. 326)

The Order r.ranting Defendant Associates' Motion for Summary Judgment was entered March 25, 1977.
filed Notice of Appeal.

(R. 327-328)

Appellant timely

(R. 338).
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF FREEPORT CENTER
Freeport Center's position which the trial court followed was that even though plaintiff's Complaint was filed well
within the applicable limitations period, its failure to have
summons issued as against Freeport Center within three months of
the filing of the Complaint retroactively nullified the Complaint
for Statute of Limitations purposes.

The lower Court clearly
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1
erred in sustaining this position for both substantive and
cedural reasons.

pre.

First, in Utah, the filing of a complaint

alone tolls the Statute of Limitations.

It is not necessary

for Statute of Limitations purposes, that summons be issued
within three months or any other time, however important the

,
I

three-months issuance requirement may be in other contexts

!

(Point II below).

I

Second, plaintiff was not required to issue

summons as to defendant Freeport Center within three months,

\

as this is a multiple-defendant case wherein issuance within I
three months is required only as to one defendant under the

I

applicable Utah Rule of Civil Procedure.

i

As the Record shows,

I
Center die I

issuance was so obtained as to both of Freeport Center's codefendants (Point III below) .

Furthermore, Freeport

not properly raise its claim from a procedural point of view, I
because pleading the affirmative defense of Statute of Limita·
tions does not call into question the sufficiency of process.
Since the defense of insufficiency of process was not pleaded,
it was waived, and could not be used in support of the Statute
of Limitations defense (Point IV below).

For any or all of

these reasons, the lower court's judgment should be reversed
and the cause remanded for trial.
POINT II
THIS ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Utah, filing the Complaint in an action tolls the

4
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Statute of Limitations with respect to any defendant named
therein whether served with Surnmons or not.

Since the Complaint.

naming Freeport Center Associates in the instant case was filed
on December 6, 1974, it is immaterial whether a three- or a
six-year statute applies since any statute was tolled approximately one year-and-a-half after the cause of action arose.
In Askwith v. Ellis, 85 U. 103, 38 P.2d 757 (1934),
the Utah Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to do any
more than file a Complaint to toll the Statute of Limitations.
The plaintiff in that case had filed a complaint which laid
dormant for seven years.

No sU1m11ons was issued within three (3)

months nor service made within one (1) year as required by the
then applicable procedural rule.

That rule (Section 104-5-5

R.S. Utah, 1933) is substantially identical to the present
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which contains
the same time limitations.

After seven years, the plaintiff

filed an amended complaint and issued and served Surnmons thereon.
Defendant moved to strike the amended complaint.

The lower court

denied the motion but held the amended complaint had actually
commenced a new action and ordered plaintiff to pay a new filing
fee.

Defendants then successfully demurred to the "new" cause

of action on the ground that it was barred by the Statute of
Limitations.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily

on Section 104-5-1 R.S. Utah, 1933, which provided that an
action could be commenced either by service of surnmons or by
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the filing of the complaint.

Rule 3 (a) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure also so provides:
A civil action is commenced (1) by
filing a complaint with the court,
or (2) by the service of summons.
Since in Askwith the action was commenced by the filing of the
original complaint within the period required by the Statute

:
0

Limitations, and remained pending because nothing was affirma.
tively done to put it out of court, the Statute of Limitations
did not bar the action.
The Askwith case clearly states the Utah rule: The
filing of a complaint alone tolls the Statute of Limitations.
Since in the instant case, the complaint was filed well within
the statutory period, the lower court erred in

~ranting Summa~

Judgment based on the Statute of Limitations defense.
POINT III
DEFENDANT FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES WAS PROPERLY SERVED
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads
in full as follows:
If an action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon within three months from the date of
such filing. The summons must be served
within one year after the filing of the
complaint, or the action will be de~med
dismissed, provided that in any action
brought against two or more defendants
in which personal service has been obtained upon one of them within the vear,
the other or others may be served or
6
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appear at any time before trial.
(emphasis added)
The obvious purpose of the exception in multiple defendant
cases is to make the conduct of multiple party lawsuits more
efficient.

It permits plaintiffs to file actions naming all

possible defendants at the outset, and then to initially proceed against those most implicated by the available evidence.
Remaining defendants can then be served as the evidence develops
in the course of discovery.

To effectuate the purpose of the

multiple defendants exception, the earlier Rule 4(b) requirement
that summons be issued within three months of the filing of the
complaint cannot be interpreted to require that summons issue
within three months as to each defendant in a multiple-defendant
case.

Such an interpretation cuts the heart out of the multiple-

defendant exception.

It would be operative only in the rare case

that the process server could not effectuate service within the
one vear period otherwise applicable.

It could not have been

the intent of those who so carefully drafted the Rule 4(b) multiple defendant exception that it be undermined by an unwarranted
construction of the three-month issuance requirement.
Rule 4(b) states that:
If an action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon within three months from the date of
such filing . .
The Rule does not state "summons must issue thereon as to each
defendant within three months .

"

In this case, summons did

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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issue within three months of the filing of the complaint. Th; I
Record shows that the comp lain t was filed December 6, 197

I

to the Davis County Sheriff's Office on December 16, 1974

I

4
(R. 18, reverse side); that summons were prepared and mailed

(R. 323);

I
and that defendant Clearfield was served on Decembe: I

23, 1974 (R. 324).

As such, plaintiff complied with the lit·

eral requirements of Rule 4(b) in multiple-defendant cases by

successfully obtaining personal service upon at least one defo.I
dant, and serving all others before trial.

Since the service

I

upon defendant Freeport Center was entirely proper, the lower
court erred in granting their Motion for Sunnnary Judgment.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS
The basis of defendant's Statute of Limitations defe::

1

is the purported insufficiency of the process served on them
September 29, 1976.

It is fundamental that claims against the

sufficiency of process will be waived if not timely asserted,
either by way of 12(b) (4) motion or in defendant's Answer. Vt;'.
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) and (h).

Defendant's Answer fi'.:

October 26, 1976, pleaded the affirmative defense of Statute o'.
Limitations, but did not raise insufficiency of process.

There·

fore, defendant has waived any defense or contention based on
insufficiency of process.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(h).

The Utah Rules clearly do not contemplate that an
attack on the insufficiency of process can be made pursuant to

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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I
I
I

I

an answer pleading only Statute of Limitations.

Limitations is recognized as an affirmative defense in Utah

I ' Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c).

I

Statute of

Insufficiencv of process is

treated separately in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4)

I

as a defense which can be raised, at the pleader's option, by
motion or by answer.

Implicit in this scheme is the recogni-

tion that pleading the Statute of Limitations as a defense does
not call into question the sufficiency of process.
The Askwith case, earlier cited, supports this position.

In that case, plaintiff filed his original complaint in

1923.

It laid dormant for seven years, at which time plaintiff

filed an amended complaint and caused service to be issued upon
it.

The defendant moved to strike the amended complaint.

The

trial court denied the motion, but held the amended complaint
was a new cause of action, and required a new filing fee to be
paid.

The defendant then made a general appearance and demurred

to the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the Statute
of Limitations.

The demurrer was sustained by the trial court,

but reversed on appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court found against

the defendant on the Statute of Limitations issue as earlier
noted, but was careful to distinguish the insufficiency of process question:
Had they [defendants] appeared specially with a motion to quash service of
summons because not made within the
year from the time the action was commenced, such motion might have been
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good. It may also be that defendants could have ignored the service
of summons, on the ground that the
return showed on its face that it
was a nullity and could not vest the
court with jurisdiction of defendants.
But they did neither. They made no
attack on the process by which it was
sought to subject them to the jurisdiction, which they may have done specially, but attacked the complaint itself--the jurisdiction of the court
over the res. They did not deny the
jurisdiction of the court, but invoked
it in their own behalf. They asked
the court to exercise its power and
jurisdiction on the action itself in
their behalf. A party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court and at the
same time deny he is in court . . .
Askwith v. Ellis, 85 U. 103, 38 P.2d
757 at 759 (1934).
Precisely the same thing has happened here.

Defendant Associa::I

appeared generally by answering and moving for su=ary judgmer.: I
I
By so appearing, it has w,aived any claims based on insufficiencl
of process.
Indeed, the Statute of Limitations is of no signifi·
cance in the case at bar.

The service of September 29, 1976,

was valid, and the action was commenced December 6, 1974, weli :
within the limitations period.

Thus, defendant's real defense

1'

was directed to the validity of service, which defense was not
timely asserted and therefore waived.
CONCLUSION
There are three sufficient reasons why the lower cou:: \

I
judgment should be reversed.
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First, the filing of the complaint tolled the Statute
of Limitations.
Second, the service upon defendant Associates was
entirely in keeping with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Third, defendant Associates was precluded from arguing
any asserted deficiencies in service because it waived them by
entering a general appearance.
IT IS THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, that the lower
Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant
Associates be reversed, and the cause be remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Nelson, Harding, Richards,
Leonard & Tate
48 Post Office Place
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Appellant
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The undersigned hereby certifies that he delivered

Ir

a copy of the attached APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Mr. Peter W. Billin,(

.

Jr. , at the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin at 800 Continental
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

__::\)...._,µ,"""\'--'v.__ _ _ _ , 19 77 .

/

84101, this

' If

;)_').___ dayof(

\

I

~ ~ 3~·CQ..I

i(

\
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